%0 Journal Article
%A McGill, B.J.
%A Brown, J.S.
%T Evolutionary game theory and adaptive dynamics of continuous traits
%B Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics
%D 2007
%V 38
%P 403-435
%Z Times Cited: 0; timestamp=(2008.02.15)
%X Continuous-trait game theory fills the niche of enabling analytically
solvable models of the evolution of biologically realistically complex
traits. Game theory provides a mathematical language for understanding
evolution by natural selection. Continuous-trait game theory starts
with the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and adds
the concept of convergence stability (that the ESS is an evolutionary
attractor). With these basic tools in hand, continuous-trait game
theory can be easily extended to model evolution under conditions
of disruptive selection and speciation, nonequilibrium population
dynamics, stochastic environments, coevolution, and more. Many models
applying these tools to evolutionary ecology and coevolution have
been developed in the past two decades. Going forward we emphasize
the communication of the conceptual simplicity and underlying unity
of ideas inherent in continuous-trait game theory and the development
of new applications to biological questions.
%K branching point; evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) RANDOMLY VARYING
ENVIRONMENTS; ESS GERMINATION STRATEGIES; TRADE-OFF GEOMETRIES; HABITAT
SELECTION; SEED SIZE; SYMPATRIC SPECIATION; DISPERSAL STRATEGIES;
POPULATION-DYNAMICS; KIN SELECTION; STRUCTURED METAPOPULATIONS
%# brugerolles
%F McGillBrown2007
%3 BibTeX type = ARTICLE